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Abstract. The act of voting is one of the most representative of Democracy, 
being widely recognized as a fundamental right of citizens. The method of 
voting has been the subject of many studies and improvements over time. The 
introduction of electronic voting or e-voting demands the fulfillment of several 
requirements in order to maintain the security levels of the paper ballot method 
and the degree of trust people place in the voting process. The ability to meet 
those requirements has been called into question by several authors. This 
exploratory research aims to identify what factors influence voters’ confidence 
in e-voting systems. A case study was conducted in an organization where such 
a system has been used in several elections. A total of 51 e-voters were 
interviewed. The factors that were found are presented and discussed, and 
proposals for future work are suggested. 
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1 Introduction 
The act of voting is a key part in democracy and one of its cardinal rights. The 
evolution that occurred in the voting process over times enables present day free 
elections to be framed in a well defined set of stages and requirements, which when 
properly implemented and enforced confer the fundamental characteristics of 
credibility and trust to all involved in the election – promoters, developers, electoral 
commissions, auditors, and most importantly, candidates and voters. 
The method of voting has undergone changes in the various stages that make up its 
life cycle in order to improve its speed, security, flexibility, availability, and cost, 
especially during the authentication of the voter, the casting of the vote, and the 
tabulation stages. 
As illustrations of the improvements implemented over time, there is the use of 
paper ballots, the development of specific legislation to streamline the voting process, 
and the introduction of mechanical means that made the process faster. In the recent 
past, we have witnessed the introduction of information technologies (IT) in the 
voting process, not without ups and downs along the way, seeking the transformation 
of the traditional voting system (paper ballot) in an electronic voting system. 
However, the introduction of these technological elements in the elections has not 
been easy or consensual, especially with regard to the suspicions that they raise, their 
ability to meet the requirements that made paper ballot method trustworthy, and to a 
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set of new questions concerning basic values like the anonymity of the vote and the 
accuracy of the system.  
IT systems are currently used in many sensitive areas of society, such as for 
processing personal data, clinical data, or financial transactions. However, it seems these 
areas gather a greater consensus and apparently greater confidence on the use of IT by 
those involved than the introduction of these same technologies in the voting process. 
In fact, electronic voting systems (EVS) are not yet widely used in elections of 
greater relevance and we observe countries moving forward and backward in 
implementing EVS for national elections: while some countries are already using 
EVS for several years, others banned its use. Between these extremes, there are cases 
of success and failure in the use of EVS [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. 
Among the various aspects that may facilitate or inhibit the success of EVS, trust 
has been recognized as a key factor [7], [8]. Along the quest for a completely 
trustworthy e-voting system – one that does not lose, add, alter, disregard, or disclose 
ballots – there is also the need to ensure that voting stakeholders also trust the system 
really has those properties [9]. 
The ability to demonstrate that EVS are trustworthy has a direct impact in the 
legitimacy and acceptance of the voting results, and it may be considered a 
prerequisite for shifting from the traditional voting systems to the voting systems on 
the Internet. Indeed, the integral acceptance of EVS must encompass all of society, 
including all voters and not just those who are predisposed to use them. If there is a 
large number of voters skeptical about this method of voting, trust in democracy may 
be compromised [6], [10]. 
The relevance of trust in e-voting may also be appreciated if one considers the 
potential goals of a deliberate attack launched against EVS, namely to produce an 
incorrect tabulation of votes, to prevent electors to cast their votes, to raise doubts 
about the legitimacy of the results of the election, to delay the promulgation of the 
results, and to violate the anonymity of the vote [11]. The possibility of any of these 
goals being achieved or the actual verification of their satisfaction casts a shadow of 
doubt among the electorate, severely affecting their confidence in those systems. 
The belief that trust plays a major role in the adoption and acceptance of EVS as 
innovative technological systems with social impact motivated the execution of this 
work. Knowing what instills confidence into electors regarding the use of EVS will 
help to understand voters’ attitude towards e-voting and to devise better ways to 
design and deploy these systems. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to identify what factors influence voters’ trust in 
EVS. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Voting Systems 
The voting systems are the means used by people who have the right to vote (the 
voters) to freely choose between different options. 
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Until the mid-nineteenth century, the elections were conducted without much 
control and privacy [12]. Everybody swore before a judge to be entitled to vote and 
having not already done, and the act of voting was exercised verbally, which means 
that a trust relationship was established between the voters and those who led the 
election (the judges). It was by then that were laid the foundations of the now widely 
accepted voting system. 
Worldwide, the most used and accepted voting system is the paper ballot voting 
system (PBVS). Briefly, the voter attends in person (with some exceptions referred to 
in the legislation) and makes a mark in his or her choice of vote on paper and puts it 
in a ballot. At the end of the period stipulated for the voting process, the votes cast in 
the ballot are manually counted. 
This voting system is mature and has been used innumerous times, which gives it a 
high degree of confidence for all to see. However, it still has certain limitations, both 
in terms of assuring the satisfaction of certain requirements (e.g., ensure that only 
those registered may vote or that the content of the vote is not eliminated during or 
after the voting period) and when compared to other voting systems (e.g., the delay 
and potential errors in the manual counting of the votes or the mandatory presence of 
voters in pre-established places in order to vote). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
other alternatives to the traditional system of voting have emerged, such as EVS. 
Electronic voting or e-voting is a voting system that uses in any of its phases 
electronic means to assist the voting process. In the context of e-voting we may 
consider two main voting systems: poll-site electronic voting systems (PEVS) and 
remote electronic voting systems (REVS). The former, as in PBVS, implies the 
presence of the elector to vote in a pre-defined and controlled place by the electoral 
commission. The latter does not imply the presence of the voter in a previously 
defined place: the vote can be cast anywhere using the Internet as a medium of 
communication between the system and the voter. This study focuses on this type of 
electronic voting systems. 
Regardless of the voting system used, in order to have quality and to transmit the 
necessary confidence to those involved in the voting process, the voting system will 
have to satisfy a set of requirements. 
2.2 Requirements of Voting Systems 
The literature review enabled the identification of a set of 12 core requirements 
against which voting systems should be analyzed and evaluated in order to judge their 
adequacy [10], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25]. 
Table 1 presents those requirements. The order in which requirements are listed 
intends to signal the importance that researchers have attributed to each one of the 
requirements, from the most important to the least important, based on the survey of 
the literature. The table is divided into five columns: the first includes the designation 
of the requirement, the second briefly describes it and the remaining columns provide 
a classification of the three voting systems considered in terms of requirements 
satisfaction. In these last three columns, a + sign indicates that the system generally 
satisfies the requirement, a - sign indicates that the system falls short of meeting the 
requirement, and a +/- sign indicates that currently the system does not meet the 
requirement, but may meet it in the short term. 
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Table 1. Relationship between Voting Requirements and Voting Systems 
Requirement Description PBVS PEVS REVS 
Authenticity Only persons with the right to vote should be able to cast a vote +/- + +/- 
Singularity Each voter should be able to vote only once + + + 
Anonymity It should not be possible to associate a vote to a voter + + - 
Integrity Votes should not be able to be modified or destroyed + + - 
Uncoercibity No voter should be able to prove the vote that has cast +/- +/- - 
Verifiability Anyone should be able to independently verify that all votes have been 
correctly counted 
+ + - 
Auditability and 
Certifiability 
Voting systems should be able to be tested, audited and certifiable by 
independent agents 
+ + + 
Mobility Voting systems should not restrict the voting place - - + 
Transparency Voting systems should be clear and transmit accuracy, precision, and 
security to voters 
+ + + 
Availability Voting systems should be always available during the voting period + + - 
Accessibility and 
Convenience 
Voting systems should be accessible by people with special needs and 
without requiring specific equipment or abilities 
+ + +/- 
Detectability and 
Recoverability 
Voting systems should detect errors, faults and attacks and recover 
voting information to the point of failure 
+ +/- +/- 
 
None of the voting systems satisfies all requirements, with systems that best meet 
certain requirements falling short of meeting other requirements. 
2.3 Trust and Voting 
In the realm of voting systems, trust may be conceived as the certainty, held by all 
electoral stakeholders, that the whole process takes place observing the desired 
assumptions, specifically with regard to the requirements that voting systems must 
meet, thus attesting the quality of the system and ensuring compliance with security 
parameters [20]. 
If there is no trust by the stakeholders of a voting process, a voting system will 
hardly succeed and any suspicion that falls on the system precipitates its discredit and 
may jeopardize the elections. Indeed, several cases of misconduct in EVS led to a 
significant decrease of citizens’ trust on e-voting [26]. The literature provides details 
about several of those cases. A set of illustrative examples follows. In 1993, during 
the trial of two EVS, it was found that in an industrial precinct in which there were no 
registered voters, the system indicated 1,429 votes for the incumbent mayor, who 
incidentally won the election by 1,425 votes [3]. In 2002, in the realm of a 
presidential election, an electronic voting machine attributed to a candidate a final 
vote count of negative 16,022 votes [5]. In the same year, in the second round of a 
presidential election, the final result of the election was decided by five votes, 
however it was found that the e-voting system had not registered 78 votes [1]. One 
year later, an electronic voting system reported results of 140,000 votes, when only 
25.000 residents were eligible to vote [5]. In 2006, an election was won by only 386 
votes out of about 150.000, losing the trail to 18.000 votes [6]. In 2007, several EVS 
were tested resulting in tabulations whose values differed from those derived from 
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manual tabulation in 56.1% of the votes counted [27]. Any of these incidents has the 
potential to undermine the trust that people place in e-voting, raising doubts about its 
value and increasing people’s reluctance to use such systems, in light of the dangers 
and risks they entail. 
Conceptually, trust can be defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party” [28, p. 712]. In a trust relationship there is an acceptance of 
vulnerability to a possible, but not expected, damaging action [29]. 
The concept of trust requires that there has to be a risk to the parties involved in the 
trust process and an interdependence between the parties since at least the interests of 
one of the parties can only be achieved if there is collaboration from other party [30]. 
Not being static, trust is situational, evolves based on the ability to predict the behavior 
of the other and it typically emerges and builds up based on past experiences. 
In voting systems, as important as meeting the requirements, systems need to 
convey that those requirements are effectively satisfied. 
In the case of e-voting, there are authors who advocate the printing of electronic 
votes and the transparency of the system by opening the source code as a way to 
transmit the necessary confidence to voters [1], [16]. 
For remote electronic voting systems, the difficulties of ensuring and 
demonstrating trust seem to become more acute. In a 1999 study, 69% of the voters 
surveyed believed that secure Internet voting would take many years to become 
reality or perhaps would never be achieved [10]. One decade later, there is still no 
EVS architecture able to reasonably provide a sufficient degree of trust to the 
electoral stakeholders. In fact, the simple consideration of the differences in terms of 
the scaling of voting systems structure shows that an attack in PBVS usually affects a 
limited number of ballots (those circumscribed to a ballot box), whereas in the case of 
EVS a simple modification may change the content of thousands of votes [31]. 
After pondering on e-voting literature, we advance the following issues as 
potentially influencing trust in electronic voting systems: 
• Information made available – the quantity and quality of information and briefings 
sessions about the e-voting system may influence the voters’ confidence in the 
system 
• History of use – the number of times an electronic voting system was used without 
presenting significant errors may influence the voters’ confidence in the system 
• Open source code – the ability to inspect the source code of the system may 
influence the voters’ confidence in the system 
• Scope of election – different elections will make voters trust differently in the 
system 
• Tests – the quantity and quality of the tests made to the system may influence the 
voters’ confidence in the system 
• Audits and Certifications – the existence of audits and certifications from the 
system development process up to the elections may influence the voters’ 
confidence in the system 
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• Development team – the recognition and reputation of the team that developed the 
system may influence the voters’ confidence in the system 
• Ability to meet requirements – the ability of a system to meet requirements, 
especially those related to the anonymity of the voter’s ballot, may influence the 
voters’ confidence in the system 
This list of issues forms the starting point for the identification and analysis of the 
factors that may influence the confidence in EVS. It will be important to determine 
whether the proposed issues are relevant to voters and whether there are other factors 
that voters consider imperative. 
3 Research Design 
The purpose of this study is to identify the factors influencing voters’ confidence in 
EVS. This goal could only be accomplished through the involvement of voters. Since 
the focus is on trust in EVS, it would be important that the study’s subjects possessed 
experience of using these systems as this would allow drawing conclusions based on 
the use of EVS rather than on the intention to use EVS. 
To this end, it was necessary to identify individuals who already had used EVS in 
situations of real elections. The authors knew a Portuguese university that had 
developed and regularly used a remote electronic voting system. After granting access 
to this research site, the inquiry was designed based on the existence of that 
population of voters. 
The first version of the aforementioned remote e-voting system was developed ten 
years ago and the system has been used in several internal elections at the 
departmental and school levels of the university, with a number of voters ranging 
from few tens to half a thousand. The typical users of the system are the professors of 
the institution. The system was one of the first of its kind to obtain the positive 
opinion of the Portuguese Data Protection National Commission and it is equipped 
with a set of security mechanisms that aim to instill transparency in the system. 
Methodologically, the study consisted in a case study. For the delimitation of the 
case we defined as subjects of interest all the professors who, belonging to the 
engineering school of that university, had used at least once the remote e-voting 
system to exercise their voting rights in the context of a real election. 
In carrying out the study we applied two research techniques: collection of 
documents and semi-structured interviews. The first technique involved the collection 
of documentation on the system in order to understand its architecture, features, and 
functionality. The second technique was the main instrument to generate data on the 
factors that may influence the confidence of voters in EVS. 
Previously to conduct the interviews, we developed the interview script, tested the 
quality of the script by asking two voters to review its wording, and elaborated a 
preliminary version of the codebook that would support the coding stage. 
The script of the interview was structured around the following five themes: 
• Assessment of the use of the remote electronic voting system 
• Opinion on EVS before using an electronic voting system and after its use 
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• Key requirements that remote electronic voting systems should satisfy 
• Use of EVS at national elections or referendums 
• Main factors influencing the confidence in EVS 
The preparation of the preliminary codebook involved the definition of a set of  
codes based on the literature review and on the questions that made up the interview 
script. 
It was also decided that the first four interviews would serve as pilot, to ensure that 
the script enabled the generation of data with enough quality to feed analysis. 
At the beginning of each interview we would request the respondent if we could 
audio record the interview. Then, interview records would be transcribed and coded. 
In order to facilitate mechanical procedures associated with coding and analysis we 
would use Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software. 
4 Description of Study 
The documents on the remote e-voting system were obtained from the system 
development team, which was composed of technical elements from the IT area and 
elements from the legal area. 
Regarding the interviews, 259 emails were sent to the faculty of seven departments 
of the school with an invitation to participate in the study. The emails asked 
professors an interview related to their use of the system. Of the 259 invitations sent, 
26 were directed to the department faculty where the system best fit in terms of 
scientific area, namely the department of information systems and technologies. We 
attempted to promote a significant number of interviews with professors pertaining to 
other departments, in order to avoid that findings would be based on a too technical 
view of the system. 
In the invitation email we described the study, emphasized the importance of 
voters’ collaboration, and assured the anonymity of the participants and that the data 
collected would only be used in the study. Although we asked for an individual 
interview in person, we also suggested as an alternative the possibility of interviews 
being conducted with the use of online communication tools, or as a last resort to the 
possibility to send the questions by email and receive the answers also by email. 
Of the 259 invitations sent, we got 51 acceptances to participate, 24 indications 
from professors who so far had not used the system (and therefore did not constitute 
subjects of the study), six responses from professors who were not available to 
schedule the interview for the period stipulated for the interviews and 14 system 
messages of email undelivered due to inexistent or full mailboxes. 
Most interviews were conducted in person at the professors’ offices during June 
and July 2011. The distribution of the 51 respondents by scientific area of the 
department is as follows: 15 (29.4%) from information systems and technologies, 9 
(17.6%) from electronics, 9 (17.6%) from civil engineering, 9 (17.6%) from 
production engineering, 5 (9.8%) from mechanical engineering, and 4 (7.8%) from 
textile engineering (one of the departments to which we had sent 23 invitations 
provided no feedback). 
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At the beginning of each interview we recalled the aim and scope of the study, 
reinforcing that the answers would be treated anonymously and solely for purposes of 
the work, and the absence of any linkage between the researchers and the 
development, maintenance, or promotion of the system. Next, we requested 
permission to audio record the interview. 
Fifty interviews were in person and one was held via Skype. Four respondents did 
not allow the audio recording of the interview. Interviews amounted to a total of about 
10 hours, with an average of 40 minutes per interview, and originated 434 pages of 
transcripts. 
As already mentioned, we started the coding stage with a provisional codebook, 
since it was not possible to establish a priori all the categories in which the responses 
of participants would be classified. Therefore, as the analysis of the interviews 
progressed, we extended the codebook as required, in a process inspired by Grounded 
Theory. Whenever a new issue arose in the interview, a new code was created and 
defined in the codebook. Sometimes the addition of the code to the codebook required 
the review of previous classifications, especially when the introduction of this new 
code led to an explosion of an existing code into subcodes (the readiness of retrieving 
previously coded units of text with a certain code provided by Atlas.ti greatly 
simplified this task). At the end of the coding stage, the codebook contained 166 
codes, of which 35 were super codes. 
5 Results 
The presentation of the main results of the study will follow the five structural themes 
listed in the research design section. 
Overall, the respondents assessed positively the remote electronic voting system 
they had used. Regarding the usability of the system, 82.7% of the interviewees were 
satisfied. Those that criticized the system pointed to difficulties in finding the email 
message they had received with details regarding the election, to prefer that this 
message had been sent from an institutional email address, and to issues with the web 
browser interface or the need to install a browser add-on for the system to work 
properly. 
With regard to the information provided about the voting process, 70.6% of the 
interviewees did not retain much more than basic information about the system 
(username, password, and URI). Still, 84.4% considered to be perfectly clear with the 
information received. 
On the composition of the system development team, there was unanimity among 
respondents that the team should include elements from the legal area, in addition to 
elements from the IT area. In what concerns the need to integrate into the team 
elements from other areas, 61.1% of respondents did not consider that additional areas 
of knowledge were in need in the development team, 16.7% claimed that it would 
make sense to integrate elements from psychology, and 11.1% suggested the inclusion 
of elements from sociology and ethics. 
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Given that the Portuguese Data Protection National Commission had issued an 
opinion on the system, we tried to find out if voters knew it and how they regarded 
it. Only 9.8% knew the opinion and its contents, 78.4% were unaware of its 
existence, and 11.8% knew of its existence, but were unaware of its contents. After 
informing the voters about that opinion and its positive result, 74.5% of the 
participants considered it very positive and important for promoting confidence in 
the system. 
In order to increase the transparency of the voting process, the system allows the 
provision to the voter of a numeric code for confirmation of the vote cast in the 
system. Questioned about this system’s feature, 48.6% of the interviewees stated to be 
unaware of it. Among those who knew it, 21.6% resorted to this mechanism and 
verified that the system correctly indicated the voting option they had expressed, and 
16.2% did not experiment the functionality. Concerning the importance of this 
mechanism, 65.7% of the interviewees considered it an important measure, 14.3% 
classified it as a minor feature. However, of the remaining 20% respondents who 
disagreed with the usefulness of the measure, 8.6% peremptorily argued that this 
feature might indicate an insecure system, since it allowed to associate codes, to 
voters and to votes. 
The second theme of the interview script concerned the participants’ opinions on 
EVS before using an e-voting system and after its use. Regarding the opinion prior to 
the use of such a system, 44.6% stated they had never thought about it before the use, 
28.6% indicated having a favorable opinion, and 26.8% reported some suspicion and 
apprehension. After using the system, 93.0% of the respondents considered that they 
felt so confident using EVS as if they had used the traditional voting system. This 
view is reinforced by the fact that only 8.3% of the participants would select the 
traditional voting system if they could choose between the two systems. Curiously, 
when questioned whether the vote may be more compromised when EVS are used 
instead of the traditional system (in the sense of a third party knowing the voting 
option of a voter), 14.6% of the interviewees considered that the vote is no more 
compromised in the case of e-voting, 43.8% thought it may be more compromised, 
and 33.3% stated that although personally they did not think so, they conceived that 
this could be the understanding of other people. 
Regarding the main requirements that an e-voting system should satisfy (the third 
theme of the interview), the respondents provided 118 indications categorized as 
illustrated in Table 2. 
Table 2. Main Requirements of e-Voting Systems 
Requirement n % 
Anonymity 38 32.2 
Mobility 27 22.9 
Integrity 17 14.4 
Usability 14 11.9 
Accessibility and Convenience 12 10.2 
Verifiability, Auditability and Certifiability 
  8   6.8 
Singularity 
  2   1.7 
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Still concerning the requirements of EVS, we asked if respondents had verified or 
tried to verify if the remote electronic voting system that they had used met the 
requirements they pointed to. Only 11.1% stated they had examined, albeit very 
superficially, some of the requirements. The remaining 88.9% asserted they had not 
carried out any verification. 
The fourth theme relates to the possibility of using EVS at the national level. With 
regard to the use of REVS, half of the participants believed that their use would not be 
desirable, mainly because there is a set of requirements that can not be met due to the 
existence of various risks, such as those related to the technical infrastructure, 
coercion, large scale, and voters’ authentication. On the other hand, 35.4% of 
respondents considered that using EVS would be possible and 4.2% considered it 
possible, but as an alternative method operating in parallel to the traditional voting 
system. In the case of PEVS, 23.9% replied negatively to the application of these 
systems since they would add little value to the voting process, 41.3% provided a 
positive response, 4.3% considered it possible, but as an alternative method to the 
traditional voting system, and 30.4% had no opinion. 
We also asked participants if they would be willing to give up of some 
requirements, such as anonymity, integrity of the vote, or uncoercibility, in order to 
have mobility, increased speed, and reduced costs with the voting process. 
Surprisingly, 75.6% of respondents answered affirmatively. 
The fifth and final theme was related to the factors that would influence voters’ 
confidence in EVS. 
With regard to the availability of the system source code, 40.4% of respondents 
believed that the code should be closed, except for the auditors, 25.0% advocated 
open source systems, and 25.0% stated to be indifferent. 
On the nature of EVS certifications, and given that the Data Protection National 
Commission’s opinion reflected a strictly legal assessment without relying on a 
technical (IT) evaluation of the system, 77.6% participants stated that the legal 
evaluation should be complemented by a technical evaluation, while 22.4% 
considered that the technical evaluation was not needed or was not essential. 
Another question aimed to establish if the electoral commission which promotes and 
monitors the electoral process could influence the confidence in the system, i.e., if the 
reputation and idoneity of its members could instill in voters greater confidence. Faced 
with this question the opinions were divided: 56.3% of respondents believed that this 
could be the case, while 43.8% considered that those were independent factors. 
Interviewees were also asked whether they were aware of negative past 
experiences with other EVS and whether these negative experiences could shake the 
confidence of voters, particularly during the debate on the possible adoption of EVS 
at national level. Approximately 70% of respondents were not aware of those 
experiences. Faced with factual accounts of some of the experiments, 70.2% reported 
that such information might adversely affect public opinion and demolish any attempt 
to implement EVS at national level. On the other hand, 29.8% of the respondents 
believed that each system should be treated as a separate system, and although these 
experiences might be used as political weapons in a debate on the adoption of EVS, 
people would be able to distinguish between the situations. 
Regarding the main factors that influence the confidence of respondents in EVS, 
the analysis of the interviews led to the aggregated results in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Main Factors Influencing Trust in EVS 
Trust Factor n % 
Different types of elections require different security levels 38 33.6 
Audits to the system and certifications awarded to the system 21 18.6 
Reputation and competency of the system development team 13 11.5 
Various uses of the system without errors 12 10.6 
Monitoring committee of the electoral process 11   9.7 
Information and explanations about the system   8   7.1 
Tests made to the system   5   4.4 
Guarantee of anonymity   3   2.7 
Transparency of the system   1   0.9 
Open source code   1   0.9 
6 Discussion 
The positive assessment of the electronic voting system is supported in a large 
majority of respondents that claimed to trust the system. To this general opinion we 
may oppose the fact that a significant number of respondents did not check if the 
system met the requirements, was unaware of certain features of the system and that 
the system had been certified by the Data Protection National Commission. The 
explanation for this apparent inconsistency may rest on participants placing their 
confidence in the system development team and in the electoral commission, and on 
the acknowledgment that they did not have major concerns on using the system given 
the limited scope of the elections. 
Before using the system, many participants had not formed an opinion on e-
voting since they had never reflected on this subject, others indicated they had some 
apprehension about this particular technology and the risks it entails, still others 
were more receptive to the use of e-voting, perhaps because they had greater 
propensity to the use of IT. After using the system, the majority of participants were 
more confident in this type of systems, with less apprehension, but revealed that 
after going through the process it remained the feeling that the freedom to vote may 
be more compromised in EVS than in the traditional system. Therefore, a 
perception that when using EVS something can go wrong and that the vote that was 
expressed may be revealed and so the voter may suffer the consequences does 
persist. 
The possibility of using e-voting in broader elections also raises divisions. On the 
one hand, there is a more conservative line of participants that advocated a gradual 
transition, from the traditional voting system to PEVS and then to REVS. On the 
other hand, a large proportion of respondents considered that PEVS are no longer 
attractive. Finally, there is a large group that thinks it is very difficult to use REVS in 
national elections. 
By comparing the five core requirements of EVS that were extracted from the 
literature with the five requirements most cited by participants we find significant 
differences, as illustrated in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Core Requirements of EVS 
Rank Literature Study 
1 Authenticity Anonymity 
2 Singularity Mobility 
3 Anonymity Integrity 
4 Integrity Usability 
5 Uncoercibility Accessibility and Convenience 
 
Although a definitive conclusion might not be possible (the ordering of 
requirements extracted from the literature resulted from the authors’ interpretation of 
the relative importance researchers attribute to the requirements and the participants’ 
ordering is limited to the case analyzed), we find that only two requirements are 
common. Albeit respondents may have taken for granted certain requirements, it 
stands out the importance attributed to anonymity and mobility, as well as the 
emphasis placed on REVS usability, a requirement less stressed in the literature. 
The issues initially proposed as potentially influencing voters’ confidence in EVS 
were expressed by participants as relevant to the process of building trust in EVS. 
The most cited factor by voters during the interviews was the scope of the 
elections: elections with different scope and relevance demand different levels of trust 
in the system, so that the degree of confidence in the system will vary with the 
election in question. 
In the second place come system audits and certifications. For the other factors 
which influence confidence in EVS opinions are divided. One example concerns if the 
system source code should be open or closed. A large group of participants argued 
that the code should be closed, except for audit purposes. Another significant group of 
respondents (closest to the IT area) only conceived confidence in this type of systems 
if the source code was open. 
The factors that were identified as influencing trust in EVS are inherently different. 
The first factor – the scope of the election – acts as a moderator of trust: the larger the 
electorate and the more important elections are the greater the demands of voters to 
trust the system. Other factors, such as the system development team and the 
monitoring committee, represent sources of trust, i.e., entities that directly instill 
voters with trust in the system. The remaining factors may ne viewed as carriers of 
trust, i.e., technologies and procedures that convey confidence in the system. These 
carriers serve as propagators or transmitters of trust from the sources of trust. Hence, 
in the case of audits and certifications, the sources of trust are the agencies that assess 
and certify the electronic voting systems, the audit reports and the certificates are the 
vehicles (carriers) of trust of those sources. 
Applying this interpretation regarding the nature of trust factors leads to the 
characterization shown in Table 5, where each factor was classified in terms of type 
(moderator, source of trust, or carrier of trust). For the carrier factors, we suggest the 
corresponding sources of trust. 
Underlying these factors there is a set of beliefs held by people. For instance, 
regarding the scope of the election there is the belief that elections with higher 
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number of voters have higher levels of complexity and increased risks. Given this 
escalation, voters require stronger evidence that the system remains worthy of trust. 
The case of open source code is also illustrative: it can be argued that underlying this 
factor is the belief that if the system source code is made publicly available, the 
community as a whole (actually a very limited and specialized subset of that 
community) may scrutinize it, or if an individual of that community modifies the 
code, the community will detect it and react against the modification. An alternative 
belief is that if the code is open is can be more easily exploited by malevolent 
individuals who will then be able to attack the system. According to this belief, source 
code should be carefully protected, namely by keeping it closed. 
Table 5. Characterization of EVS Trust Factors 
Trust Factor Type Source of Trust 
Different types of elections require different security levels moderator - 
Audits to the system and certifications awarded to the system carrier audit agencies 
certification agencies 
Reputation and competency of the system development team source - 
Various uses of the system without errors carrier past voting communities 
Monitoring committee of the electoral process source - 
Information and explanations about the system carrier monitoring committee 
development team 
Tests made to the system carrier system testers 
Guarantee of anonymity carrier monitoring committee 
development team 
Transparency of the system carrier development team 
Open source code carrier community at large 
In the end, we may be able to reduce the phenomenon of trust in EVS to the 
credibility that voters attach to the sources of trust and to the reliability they recognize 
carriers of trust possess. The sources of trust that a voter chooses and the carriers of 
trust that a voter favors both depend on the beliefs of the voter. Isolating these beliefs, 
identifying the sources of trust, and assessing the carriers of trust may be the way to 
understand the degree of confidence voters place in an e-voting system and to provide 
the means to build and deploy trustworthy EVS. 
7 Conclusion 
In this study we identified the factors that influence voters’ confidence in electronic 
voting systems by undertaking a case study on the use of a remote electronic voting 
system in which 51 voters were interviewed. 
The main contribution of this work is the list of factors that voters consider 
influence their confidence in EVS, in order of relevance and characterized according 
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to the role they play in the process of instilling trust in voters. Another contribution of 
this study is the set of requirements that respondents claimed to be essential to EVS to 
satisfy, and its comparison with the set of requirements extracted from the literature. 
The findings of the case study embody a set of recommendations to be taken into 
account in the implementation of voting processes using IT systems. 
We also argue that by considering the nature of each of the factors – moderator of 
the degree of trust, source of trust, or carrier of trust – we are better equipped to 
understand the degree of confidence that voters place in this type of systems, as well 
as the processes underlying the formation of voters’ attitudes in what concerns the 
adoption and use of EVS. 
The work enriches the literature by focusing on the factors that electors favor as 
definers of their confidence in EVS. This complements several propositions of EVS 
architectures found in the literature that seek to address specific security 
requirements from a technical point of view. Hence, the findings provide context 
for the use of EVS by voters. By knowing what fosters trust on EVS from the 
perspective of voters, we will be in a better position to design trustworthy voting 
processes and systems, as well as to devise improved procedures to verify and audit 
their technical properties. 
The study has several limitations. Although it is not easy to find voters who have 
already used remote electronic voting systems, a larger number of interviews would 
allow a deeper understanding of the processes and conditions that lead to the 
establishment of a relationship of trust between voters and EVS. 
Another limitation relates to the characteristics of the case study, since the 
elections analyzed refer to a small universe of voters, have a restrict scope and were 
promoted within a controlled and culturally homogeneous environment. In addition, 
the participants in this study are extremely qualified individuals with a high cultural 
level, so this group of voters is not representative of the electorate. 
This paper reports an exploratory study on EVS trust factors which leaves open 
many opportunities for future work. We restricted the study’s subjects to voters and it 
would be worthy to obtain a view of other stakeholders in the process of EVS 
adoption, such as developers and auditors, and to find out whether the factors that 
these groups recognize as influencing trust in e-voting differ from those found in this 
study. 
Another work would be to build a variance model based on the trust factors 
identified and test the causal relationships with a research design that involved a 
representative sample of the electorate at the national level. 
A more qualitative research would be to build a model to explain the process of 
formation, maintenance, and deterioration of stakeholders’ trust in EVS. 
Besides these proposals for future work, there are specific issues that arose during 
the study and that require a better explanation, such as the reasons that led some 
voters to consider that the vote might be more compromised in EVS than in the 
traditional voting system and the extent to which voters are willing to sacrifice certain 
requirements of the voting process in favor of other requirements. 
These are research opportunities worth pursuing so that we can better understand 
trust in e-voting systems and to improve the chances of EVS being successful. 
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